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Abstract 
In this paper, we provide new evidence on the association of state ownership and tax planning and 
show that shareholders’ monitoring incentives affect a firm’s tax planning. Using the unique 
setting of the German corporate tax system, we distinguish between state owners that directly 
benefit from state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs’) income tax payments and those that do not. Our 
results indicate that the negative association between state ownership and tax planning is 
concentrated in SOEs where the state owner directly benefits from the tax payments. These results 
are robust to various specifications and suggest that shareholders’ monitoring incentives are a 
determinant of firms’ tax planning activities. 
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1. Introduction 
This study investigates if and to what extent shareholders’ monitoring incentives affect tax-
planning activities. Specifically, we analyze the tax planning activities of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), where the government acts not only as a tax collector but also as a shareholder. As such, 
the state owner benefits from the firm’s profit in two distinct ways. First, as a tax collector, the 
state owner can benefit from the firm’s income tax payments, provided that the state owner is 
actually collecting the tax in question.1 Second, as a shareholder, the state owner receives its share 
of after-tax profit distributions. In its role as a shareholder, the state owner faces a trade-off because 
the state owner benefits from the tax payments but this burden translates to lower dividend 
distributions. This trade-off poses the question whether SOEs engage in more or less tax planning 
than Non-SOEs, a question about which prior studies have provided ambiguous empirical evidence 
(e.g., Lin et al. 2018; Bradshaw et al. 2019). In this paper, we investigate whether the different 
incentives of state owners who benefit to varying degrees from income tax revenues affect the tax 
planning activities of an SOE. We provide evidence that SOEs engage in less tax planning only 
when the state owner directly benefits from the tax revenues, suggesting that a shareholder’s 
monitoring incentives are an important determinant of a firm’s tax planning decision.  
The theoretical predictions and empirical findings on the association of state ownership 
and tax planning are ambiguous. On the one hand, state owners can use their shareholder rights to 
incentivize a lower effective tax rate and increase their after-tax dividend. To pursue that goal, 
state owners may pressure tax authorities to act more favorably towards SOEs (e.g., Brown et al. 
 
1 Not all state owners benefit from the tax payments because a state owner is not necessarily the governmental entity 
that receives the tax payments. In our setting, for example, the state owner can be the regional governmental entity, 
which, unlike local and federal governments, does not levy and receive a corporate income tax. We explain this 
difference between state owners in more detail in Section 2.1 and exploit it in our research design (see Section 3.2). 
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2015; Kim and Zhang 2016; Lin et al. 2018). On the other hand, prior findings suggest that SOEs 
exhibit lower tax avoidance relative to Non-SOEs, implying that the incentive to maximize tax 
revenues dominates (Wu et al. 2012; e.g., Bradshaw et al. 2019). In that scenario, tax planning 
seems to constitute a “zero sum game” because higher after-tax dividends translate to lower tax 
revenues, assuming that the state owner would directly benefit from the tax revenues (i.e., the state 
owner is the governmental entity that receives the tax payments of the SOE) .  
However, the assumption that a state owner directly benefits from a firm’s income tax 
payments does not always hold. In a decentralized setting, where the federal, state, and/or local 
government levy income taxes and own enterprises, ownership and generation of tax revenues do 
not necessarily coincide. In this paper, we exploit this variation and investigate how different types 
of state owners with different incentives affect the tax planning activities of SOEs. Specifically, 
we predict that SOEs owned by state owners that directly benefit from income tax payments 
engage in less tax planning than Non-SOEs and SOEs owned by state owners that do not receive 
income tax payments. In other words, we ask whether the tax planning activities of SOEs depend 
on a state owner’s incentives in order to address the broader question on how a shareholder’s 
monitoring incentives affect a firm’s tax planning activities.  
In our empirical tests, we use a sample of German firms with SOEs and Non-SOEs because 
it allows us to examine different types of state owners within a market-based economy. The 
German corporate tax regime is particularly useful for our research question because we can 
differentiate between three governmental levels: federal, state, and local (more than 11,000 
municipalities). Of these, the federal and local governments directly levy and benefit from income 
taxes while other governments (e.g., the 16 states in Germany) do not levy corporate income tax. 
Therefore, this setting allows us to distinguish between two types of state owners: those that benefit 
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from increased tax payments (federal and local state owners) and those that do not (non-federal 
and non-local state owners). We use this cross-section of state owners in our empirical tests 
because only state owners directly benefiting from the tax payments have incentives to monitor 
their firms and demand less tax planning. Moreover, Germany is a market-based economy in which 
governmental interference is relatively low. In contrast, most prior studies on SOEs’ tax planning 
activities use samples of Chinese firms but note that governmental interference is still relatively 
high in China. This interference translates to preferential tax treatment of SOEs (e.g., Wu et al. 
2012)2 and relatively weaker governance structures of Chinese firms in general (Bauer et al. 2019). 
Taken together, we believe that the German tax regime provides an interesting setting, which also 
allows us to generalize our findings.  
Using unconsolidated financial data of private German firms from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis 
database, we find some evidence for an overall negative association of state ownership and tax 
planning. Further, we find that this negative association only holds for those SOEs with a state 
owner that directly benefits from the tax revenues. We run several sensitivity and robustness tests 
to confirm these initial results. First, we run all of our tests with an alternative measure of tax 
avoidance that controls for the difference in statutory tax rates between municipalities.3 Second, 
we use entropy balancing and propensity score matching (PSM) to account for observable 
differences between SOEs and Non-SOEs.  Lastly, we conduct tests in an SOE-only sample and 
find similar results to the full sample tests that include also Non-SOEs. We also find that the 
observed effect is concentrated in municipalities with a relatively low tax rate, suggesting that 
 
2 A recent report by the Australian Tax and Transfer Pricing Institute (TTPI) institute provides further insight on the 
preferential tax incentives in China: https://www.austaxpolicy.com/china-state-oriented-attitude-towards-tax-
incentives/  
3 As outlined in more detail in Section 3.1, the municipalities determine a significant fraction of the overall corporate 
income tax burden of German firms. We also use this special feature of the German tax system for additional tests 
(see Section 4.3). 
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local state owners monitor their SOEs towards higher tax payments only when the relative tax 
burden is not already high. Overall, our results suggest that shareholder monitoring incentives 
affect the tax planning activities of firms. Moreover, our findings present a more nuanced view of 
the relationship between state ownership and tax planning than the literature currently suggests. 
While prior research interprets lower tax planning in SOEs as an indicator for governmental power 
over the firm (Wu et al. 2012), our results imply that state owners, just like any other shareholder, 
can have different monitoring incentives. 
Our findings contribute to prior research in three ways. First, we contribute to the literature 
on the role of agency conflicts in corporate tax planning (Desai and Dharmapala 2006). Following 
the agency framework of Desai and Dharmapala (2006), prior studies investigate the effect of a 
firm’s corporate governance structure on the association of state ownership and tax planning. For 
example, Bradshaw et al. (2019) find that managers of Chinese SOEs cater to the interest of the 
government, the majority shareholder, in order to positively influence their promotion decisions. 
In this setting, the positive association between state ownership and tax planning is stronger when 
the government shareholder has more influence on the firm. These findings are in line with the 
agency theory of tax planning, which describes a manager’s tax planning decision as a function of 
the manager’s incentive structure and the corporate governance of the firm (Desai and Dharmapala 
2006; 2009). However, while this stream of research investigates the incentive structure of the 
manager (i.e., the agent), we focus on the monitoring incentives of the shareholder (the principal). 
In contrast to common perception and prior research (e.g., Wu et al. 2012), we find that state 
owners only act as monitoring shareholders (in terms of the tax function) when they directly benefit 
from the tax revenues.  
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Second, we add to the strand of literature that investigates the association of state 
ownership and tax avoidance. While some studies find that state owned firms engage in less tax 
planning (e.g., Zeng 2010; Wu et al. 2012; Bradshaw et al. 2019), other studies (Brown et al. 2015; 
Lin et al. 2018) find that politically connected firms experience lower tax enforcement. This 
finding implies that SOEs, which are likely politically connected by nature, have more tax planning 
opportunities and thus a lower tax burden. We add to these contrary findings by focusing on the 
incentives of state owners. As such, we provide evidence that these incentives are an important 
determinant for the tax planning activities of SOEs when the state owner directly benefits from tax 
revenues and thus has an incentive to monitor SOEs accordingly.  
Finally, our results are of interest to policymakers. Despite waves of privatizations and a 
subsequent decrease of SOEs, a study by the OECD reveals that around 10 percent of the 2,000 
largest firms in the world are SOEs (Kowalski et al. 2013). Moreover, the 2008 Financial Crisis 
and more recently the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic initiated increases in state ownership. For 
example, during the 2008 Financial Crisis, the U.S. government provided aid to struggling firms 
such as General Motors in return for shares. Similarly, Italy became a shareholder of the airline 
Air Italia as a reaction to the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. This health crisis has inspired additional 
political discussions about linking governmental equity injections with a decrease in the respective 
firms’ tax planning activities. On this point, our study informs policymakers that the direct 
participation in tax revenues can be an effective monitoring tool to curb the tax planning activities 
of SOEs. This result should also appeal to private shareholders (i.e., non-state-owners) of SOEs 
because they might face lower returns due to less tax planning activities. 
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2. Background, Prior Research, and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 The German Setting 
The German government is divided into three levels, i.e., the federal level, the state level, 
and the local (or municipal) 4  level and state ownership is common in all three levels 
(Bundeskartellamt 2014). Some well-known examples are Deutsche Telekom with the federal 
government owning 17.41% and Volkswagen AG with the state government of Lower Saxony 
owning 20% (State of Lower Saxony 2017; Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2018). While the 
federal government’s involvement often has historic reasons (e.g., the government’s role as 
provider of telecommunication) and has been decreasing since a wave of privatizations over the 
last decades, municipal state ownership has increased during the last years (Bundeskartellamt 
2014). Historically, municipalities invested in businesses activities of public interest (e.g., waste 
management or hospitals) but have broadened their scope of activities over the last years to sectors 
such as food processing (Bardt and Fuest 2007).    
Public economists view this development critically because, among other reasons, they fear 
a competitive advantage of these SOEs over private business activities (Bundeskartellamt 2014). 
This concern is partly rooted in the potentially beneficial tax treatment. However, to receive a 
favorable tax treatment, an SOE has to be organized as a non-profit firm. Moreover, the local 
business tax5 is one of the municipalities’ main sources of tax revenues such that preferential tax 
treatment would hurt their revenue base. In fact, a current report by the German Anti-trust 
Commission mentions higher tax revenues (from the SOEs themselves as well as from positive 
 
4 We use the terms “local government” and “municipality government” interchangeably. 
5 The local business tax is the corporate income tax that is levied by the local governments. We describe the German 
corporate tax setting in more detail in Section 3.1. 
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spillovers) as one reason for the increase of SOE activity over the last years (Monopolkommission 
2014).  
Income tax on business activities is levied on the federal level (individual and corporate 
income tax) at a flat rate of 15.825 percent6 and on the municipal level (local business tax, LBT). 
Municipalities determine the LBT, which is also flat and ranges from 7 to over 30 percent across 
municipalities, depending on the municipality the firm is headquartered in.7 The 16 states do not 
levy an own income tax but receive a federal re-distribution of individual and corporate income 
tax revenues, which follows a mechanism based on a state’s economic strength 
(“Finanzausgleich”). 
Taken together, the German setting provides a sufficient number of SOEs and, importantly, 
variation in the state owners’ incentives. Specifically, we use the different incentives that state 
owners from the three levels of government have because some state owners directly benefit 
(federal and local governments) from tax payments of their SOEs while others (e.g., state 
governments) do not benefit. 
2.2 Ownership Structure and Tax Planning 
A firm’s ownership structure and governance is one of the determinants of corporate tax 
planning acitvities (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). In this line, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) argue 
that a firm’s propensity to engage in tax planning depends on a manager’s incentive structure and 
the firm’s overall governance. Firms with strong governance structures facilitate tax planning as 
 
6 15% federal corporate income tax plus 5.5% federal additional surcharge (“Solidarity Surcharge”) on the federal 
corporate income tax. We account for this when we calculate statutory tax rates. 
7 The taxable income of firms with several branches across different municipalities is apportioned to the respective 
municipalities based on wages paid. However, the number of firms with business activities on more than one 
municipality is rather low (see, for example, Bethmann 2017). 
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shareholder are less concerned with managerial rent extraction due to tax planning, especially 
when firms have relatively low levels of tax planning (Armstrong et al. 2015). This insight 
motivates research on the association of a firm’s shareholder structure and its tax planning 
activities because shareholders have a significant influence on a firm’s corporate governance 
structure (e.g., Wilde and Wilson 2018). Similarly, the presence of majority shareholders shapes a 
firm’s governance structure in various dimensions, especially because minority shareholders may 
suffer from rent extraction by the majority shareholder (Desai and Dharmapala 2006; 2009). 
Therefore, even though tax planning can increase the overall value of the firm, it might decrease 
minority shareholders’ wealth. This ambiguous setting motivates various studies that investigate 
the effect on tax planning activities under the presence of certain majority shareholders.  
For example, focusing on the influence of family owners as majority shareholders, Chen 
et al. (2010) predict and find that family ownership is associated with less tax planning activities. 
This is a signal to non-family minority shareholders, who could fear rent extraction masked by tax 
planning. Similarly, Khurana and Moser (2013) provide evidence that firms with long-term 
institutional investors are less tax aggressive. However, using a regression discontinuity design 
that allows for a more direct identification, Khan et al. (2017) find that institutional ownership 
actually leads to more tax aggressiveness. Moreover, Cheng et al. (2012) find that firms become 
more tax aggressive after hedge funds with tax expertise invest in a firm. These results imply that 
certain (institutional) investors monitor management such that it becomes more tax-efficient (i.e., 
uses all legal means to decrease its tax liability). Therefore, next to rent extraction by majority 
shareholders (Desai and Dharmapala 2006), monitoring and preventing management entrenchment 
is another channel through which owners influence a firm’s tax planning activities. In this line, 
McGuire et al. (2014) find that dual class ownership firms are less tax aggressive, which hints at 
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suboptimal tax planning by entrenched managers. As dual class ownership structures disentangle 
control and cash-flow rights, managers can have excessive voting right and engage in suboptimal 
(i.e., too little) tax planning. Therefore, greater agency conflicts between control and cash-flow 
rights (i.e., between managers and shareholders) affect the tax planning outcome.  
2.3 State Ownership and Tax Planning 
A special form of concentrated shareholding is state ownership. Traditionally, state-owned 
enterprises are rare in the U.S. and most academic studies use a Chinese setting, where the 
government acts as a shareholder of a significant portion of firms.8 In the Chinese setting, Zeng 
(2010) investigates the association of concentrated ownership and tax planning and finds that firms 
with concentrated ownership engage more in tax planning, relative to firms with spread ownership. 
Moreover, the study tests two contradicting hypotheses on state ownership. While state-owned 
firms can pursue a strategy to increase firm value by decreasing tax payments (i.e., increasing 
after-tax profits), the government has an interest to increase tax revenues to fund government 
activities. The study provides empirical evidence for the latter as Chines SOEs engage in less tax 
planning relative to Non-SOEs.  
Similarly, Wu et al. (2012) investigate the role of Chinese state ownership on the 
association of firm size and tax avoidance. Addressing inconsistent results in prior studies on the 
relationship of size and tax planning, the authors predict and find that size and tax planning are 
positively associated for SOEs. The reason for the moderating effect of state ownership is that big 
SOEs, relative to smaller SOEs, have more political power (e.g., through lobbying). Bigger firms 
 
8 During the 2008 Financial Crisis, the U.S. government increased its involvement in the economy through bailouts 
(e.g., General Motors or Citigroup). This government involvement has started discussion about state ownership also 
in the U.S. (see, for example, Kahan and Rock 2011). 
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without government ownership (“Non-SOEs”), on the other hand, are less tax aggressive as they 
are more prone to regulatory scrutiny and have less tax planning opportunities relative to smaller 
Non-SOEs (this goes back to the “political cost view”, see Zimmerman 1983; Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986). Another factor that determines a firm’s tax strategies in the Chinese setting is 
the preferential tax treatment of certain firms. In this line, Wu et al. (2012) provide evidence that 
size and tax planning are not associated for firms with preferential tax treatment.  
While these studies imply a mitigating effect of state ownership on tax planning in China, 
there is also evidence for a positive association of state ownership and tax planning activities. 
State-owned firms have closer political connections, and they can use this power to change tax law 
(or its enforcement) in their favor. In a U.S. setting for private firms, Brown et al. (2015) show 
that firms that invest in close connections to policymakers through campaign donations have lower 
future effective tax rates. Similarly, Kim and Zhang (2016) find that politically connected firms 
are less aggressive than non-connected firms. These results imply a favorable tax treatment of 
private firms closely connected to the government. Such implication likely extends to SOEs. Using 
data on Chinese firms and tax audits, Lin et al. (2018) provide similar evidence for the enforcement 
channel,  suggesting that politically connected firms (i.e., firms with politically connected board 
members) benefit from a preferential tax treatment.  
Taken together, theory as well as prior research is ambiguous about the association of state 
ownership and tax planning and we pose the following non-directional hypothesis (in the 
alternative form): 
H1: SOEs exhibit a different level of tax planning compared to Non-SOEs. 
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While the studies outlined above test for differences between state-owned and not state-
owned firm, they do not address differences within state ownership (i.e., between different types 
of state ownership). In a Chinese setting, Chan et al. (2013) find, similar to Zeng (2010) and Wu 
et al. (2012), that SOEs are less tax aggressive than Non-SOEs. However, Chan et al. (2013) add 
cross-sectional evidence as firms with local state owners from less developed regions engage in 
more tax planning. The study relates this finding to lower corporate governance implementation 
standards in these regions. Bradshaw et al. (2019) also find differences between central and local 
shareholders in a Chinese setting. Specifically, they find that SOEs report higher ETRs than Non-
SOEs but this effect is only present in local SOEs. The authors provide evidence that management 
career concerns drive this result as the promotions of managers of Chinese SOEs are contingent 
on government evaluations. Local governments tend to influence these evaluations more than the 
central government and therefore managers of local SOEs are more prone to political interventions 
and aim to “please the government” by paying more taxes.  
We add to this literature by focusing on the different incentive structures that different state 
owners have. In particular, we focus on the return a state owner generates by investing in an SOE. 
To illustrate, imagine an SOE that is fully owned by the government. Moreover, the government 
also receives all of the corporate tax payments of that SOE. In this scenario, the government is 
indifferent on whether it receives the SOE’s profit as tax payment or as dividend (“zero sum 
game”). The German setting, however, is different. German income tax on business activities is in 
part a federal corporate income tax and in part a local (municipal) business tax.9 Municipal (federal) 
state owners directly benefit from the corporate tax payments only with regard to their respective 
 
9 Both, the federal corporate income tax and the local business tax have a very similar tax base and only differ in terms 
of the tax rate. 
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municipal (federal) income tax. Other state owners (e.g., the 16 states) do not directly benefit from 
either tax.10 Therefore, we predict that SOEs owned by state owners with a direct claim on the tax 
revenues (i.e., local or federal owners) incentivize management to be more tax compliant. Formally, 
we state the following hypothesis (in the alternative form): 
H2: Relative to SOEs with state owners that do not directly benefit from tax revenues, SOEs with 
state owners that directly benefit from tax revenues engage in less tax planning. 
3. Data and Research Design 
3.1 The German Corporate Tax System and Measures of Tax Avoidance 
Statutory tax rates include the federal corporate income tax rate of 15.825 percent and the 
local business tax rate (LBT), which differs across municipalities. In our sample, the median and 
mean LBT rate are 14.2 percent. Apart from the LBT rate differentials, there are no tax regime 
differences between the municipalities. That is, the LBT base is the same independent of a firm’s 
location, but rates vary depending on the municipality a firm is headquartered in. To gauge tax 
planning in this setting, we refer to prior research and adapt two measures. First, we define a firm’s 
effective tax rate (ETR) as: 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡
 (1) 
where 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  is total tax expense and 𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡  is pre-tax income (both at the firm-year 
level). Following prior studies, a lower ETR indicates more tax avoidance (e.g., Chen et al. 2010).  
 
10 These other state owners may benefit indirectly via transfer payments. However, such benefit is more uncertain and 
considerably less in amount. 
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Due to the tax rate variation between municipalities, the ETR does not capture “statutory” 
differences in tax rate. Therefore, as a second measure, we adapt the tax avoidance measure 
developed by Atwood et al. (2012). This measure is mostly used to control for between-country 
differences in statutory tax rates as the measure relates a firm’s ETR to the given jurisdiction’s 
statutory tax rate (e.g., De Simone, Stomberg, et al. 2019). In our setting, there are different within-
country jurisdictions, namely the different municipalities. Thus, we define TaxAvoid as: 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝜏𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡
=  𝜏𝑚,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
where 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is total tax expense, 𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is pre-tax income (both at the firm-year level), 
and 𝜏𝑚,𝑡 is the total statutory tax rate (i.e., federal corporate tax rate plus the respective LBT rate) 
in municipality m in year t.  The interpretation of this measure is mirroring that of the ETR: higher 
TaxAvoid indicates higher tax avoidance. By definition (and as evident in Table 2), TaxAvoid is 
highly correlated with ETR, but still provides additional information as it directly controls for 
different statutory tax rates between municipalities.11 
3.2 Research Design 
To test our predictions, we follow Chen et al. (2010) and estimate the model below using 
OLS: 
{
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
 
11 For both ETR and TaxAvoid, we use the total tax expense rather than the current tax expense due to data restrictions 
(for a discussion, see, for example, Dyreng et al. 2008). Similarly, we cannot extend this measure by a cash component 
to calculate the cash effective tax rate as the Orbis database (and the financial reporting environment) does not provide 
information on actual cash effective tax payments. 
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where ETR (see Equation 1) is the effective tax rate and TaxAvoid (see Equation 2) the tax 
avoidance measure developed by Atwood et al. (2012). As described above, German corporations 
pay taxes to both the federal government and the local municipalities. The TaxAvoid measure, 
which in its original application accounts for differences of statutory tax rates between countries, 
captures the deviation of the effective tax rate from the municipality-specific statutory tax rate.  
SOE is a dummy variable that equals one if a state owner has a direct shareholding in the 
firm. Therefore, 𝛽1  is our coefficient of interest. Following H1, we predict 𝛽1  to be positive 
(negative), meaning that SOEs have higher ETRs (lower tax avoidance, TaxAvoid). More 
importantly, we also differentiate between two types of state owners: those that directly benefit 
from the firm s´ income tax payments (i.e., federal and municipal), and those that do not (e.g., the 
16 states). We separately estimate Equation (3) for a sample with these two types of state owners 
(both times we include non-SOEs as benchmark). Following H2, we predict 𝛽1 to be positive only 
when the state owner benefits from the income tax payments. 
To account for time-invariant industry fixed effects, we include industry indicators (𝛼𝑗) at 
the NACE two-digit level. Moreover, we add indicators for the 16 states in Germany to account 
for time-invariant state characteristics. This is important as States have the authority to regulate 
state ownership within their jurisdiction (Bundeskartellamt 2014). These regulations are relatively 
time-invariant and we can therefore capture these fixed effects with our approach. Finally, we 
control for macroeconomic time-variant fixed effects by including year indicators (𝛼𝑡). 
The vector Controls includes control variables similar to those used in Chen et al. (2010). 
Specifically, we include RoA to control for differences in profitability as profitable firms might 
face different tax planning incentives (e.g., Graham et al. 2014). Similarly, prior research (e.g., 
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Zimmerman 1983) provides evidence that firm size is related to tax planning, which is why we 
include Size (defined as the natural logarithm of total assets in year t-1) as control variable. 
Moreover, firms can carry forward losses and deduct interest payments from their tax base, which 
affects tax payments. We control for these deductions by including the variables LossFirm and 
Leverage. LossFirm is a dummy that equals one if the firm has a loss in more than half of the years 
in our sample period.12 Moreover, we control for a firm’s assets composition as the proportion of 
tangible and intangible assets potentially affects a firm’s tax planning (e.g., De Simone, Mills, et 
al. 2019). Therefore, we include Tangibility and Intangible as control variables, measured as 
tangible assets over lagged total assets and intangible assets over lagged total assets, respectively. 
Finally, we include lagged sales growth (SalesGrowth) to capture growth opportunities as growth 
(and investment) can affect a firm’s access to special tax deductions (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2012). 
While most studies (e.g., Chen et al. 2010) use market-to-book ratios to approximate growth 
opportunities, we use sales growth as our sample includes non-listed firms only. Finally, we 
include a dummy that equals one for firms that have a majority shareholder (i.e., a shareholder 
with a shareholding greater than 50 percent). This dummy captures the tax planning effects of 
blockholders (Khurana and Moser 2013; Khan et al. 2017). Appendix A provides an overview of 
all variable definitions. 
3.3 Data and Sample Selection 
We collect data on unconsolidated financial statements and the ownership structure of 
German firms from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database, for the period 2007-2015. We exclude 
financial (NACE 6400 to 6899) and utility (NACE 3500 to 3999) firms as both fall under specific 
regulations (e.g., Badertscher et al. 2013). Moreover, we drop observations from industries (NACE 
 
12 Our data do not contain a variable similar to net operating loss (NOL) in Compustat samples. 
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two digit) that do not include SOEs to allow for within-industry analyses and we drop observations 
of non-profit firms as these are likely tax-exempt. We also drop observations with missing values 
for our dependent or independent variables.13  We then check the data for outliers and drop 
observations with values of our dependent and some independent variables that are outside of the 
1 and 99 percentile. Our final sample includes 124,613 firm-year observations. Appendix B 
summarizes our sample selection. 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our full sample as well as various subsamples. In 
the full sample (Panel A), the average ETR equals 26.51 percent, which is close to the sample’s 
average statutory tax rate of 29.75 percent. The mean value of SOE implies that 2.17 percent of 
firms-years are observation with state ownership. In absolute numbers, this translates to 2,698 out 
of 124,613 firm-years (797 out of 48,367 unique firms). Comparing the Non-SOE sample (Panel 
B) with the SOE-only sample (Panel C) indicates a significant difference between the mean ETRs 
of these two groups. The ETR of Non-SOEs is about 4 percentage points higher than the ETR of 
SOEs.14 Moreover, Non-SOEs (Panel B) and SOEs (Panel C) differ significantly in terms of most 
control variables. This motivates our choice to control for these variables in all our tests and to use 
weighting and matching techniques as well as sub-sample tests that only include SOEs. 
In Panel D and E of Table 1, we provide descriptive statistics on the sub-sample of SOEs. 
Specifically, out of 2,698 total SOE firm-years, SOEs with a state owner that directly benefits from 
the tax revenues account for 1,156 firm-years (337 out of 797 unique firms). The remaining SOEs 
 
13 As we find enormous outliers for SalesGrowth, we follow Engel and Middendorf (2009) and exclude observations 
with values of SalesGrowth higher (lower) than 300% (-300%).  
14 Untabulated tests show that this difference is only significant (economically as well as statistically) when industry 
fixed effects are not controlled for. Therefore, we include industry fixed effects in all our tests. 
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account for 1,542 firm-years (460 out of 797 unique firms). Moreover, Panel D and E reveal that 
SOEs whose owner directly benefits from the tax revenues have significantly higher ETRs (lower 
tax avoidance) than SOEs with state owners that do not directly benefit from tax revenues. 
4. Results 
4.1 Full sample tests 
Table 3 presents the regressions results from Equation (3). In the full sample test with ETR 
as dependent variable (Table 3, Column 1), the coefficient on SOE (𝛽1 ) is positive but not 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.47). Similarly, the coefficient on SOE in the specification with 
TaxAvoid as dependent variable (Column 4) is not significant (p-value = 0.57) but negative as 
expected. Most of the coefficients of the control variables are statistically significant (also in joint 
tests) and reassure our choice to include them in the estimation. Based on this first result, we fail 
to reject the null that there is no difference in tax planning activities between SOEs and Non-SOEs 
(H1). However, to account for observable differences between SOEs and Non-SOEs, we apply 
two weighting and matching techniques, namely entropy balancing and propensity score matching 
(PSM).  
First, following Hainmueller (2012), we balance the observations of the treatment (SOEs) 
and control (Non-SOEs) group using all three moments of the distribution of the control variables 
from Equation (3). Table 4 provides the mean, variance, and skewness of the covariate distribution 
before (Panel A) and after (Panel B) entropy balancing for SOEs and Non-SOEs. The covariate 
means of SOEs and Non-SOEs before entropy balancing (Panel A, Table 4) resemble those in 
Table 1 (Panel B for Non-SOEs and Panel C for SOEs). While the differences in the means of the 
covariates are statistically significant for all covariates before balancing, no covariate mean is 
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statistically significant after balancing (Panel B of Table 4). Therefore, by using entropy balancing, 
we can mitigate concerns that observable differences between SOEs and Non-SOEs affect our 
results. Table 5 presents the results of estimating Equation (3) using the entropy-balanced sample. 
For both dependent variables, the coefficient on SOE is again not statistically significant (Columns 
1 and 4). Therefore, also based on the balanced sample test, we cannot reject the null that there is 
no difference in tax planning activities between SOEs and Non-SOEs.  
Second, we follow Shipman et al. (2017) and apply PSM using a logit estimation to account 
for observable differences in the control and treatment group. Specifically, PSM addresses 
concerns of observable differences between SOEs and Non-SOEs and functional form 
misspecification affecting our results. We use a one-to-one matching with replacement that assigns 
each observation in the treatment group (SOEs) the closest match in the control group (non-SOEs) 
in terms of the observable control variables (i.e., the control variables from Equation 3). We 
present descriptive statistics of the matched sample in Table 6. As we allow for replacement in the 
matching, the sample size of the matched sample is 4,515 while the estimation sample is slightly 
bigger (5,393 observations; see Table 7), indicating that some control firms are used twice (or 
more) in the estimation. Importantly, while there are statistically significant differences in the 
covariate means of SOEs and Non-SOEs before matching (Panel C and Panel B of Table 1), most 
differences are not statistically significant after matching (Panel C and Panel B of Table 6).  
We present the estimation results of the matched sample in Table 7 and find that the 
coefficient on SOE is statistically significant for both dependent variables (Columns 1 and 4). The 
positive (negative) sign for ETR (TaxAvoid) implies that SOEs engage in less tax planning relative 
to Non-SOEs. Taken together, we interpret the null results from the OLS and entropy balancing 
estimations and the significant results from the PSM estimation as evidence for the theoretical 
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ambiguous prediction on the association of state ownership and tax avoidance. Therefore, our 
findings reflect the inconsistent findings from prior studies (e.g., Zeng 2010; Lin et al. 2018). 
4.2 State Owner Incentives 
Our second hypothesis (H2) poses that differences in state owners’ incentives affect tax 
planning activities of SOEs. Specifically, we predict that state owners that directly benefit from 
the tax revenues have higher incentives to monitor an SOE’s tax planning. In Germany, municipal 
(federal) state owners are the main recipient of the local business tax (corporate income tax) 
revenues and therefore have an incentive to monitor the tax planning activities of SOEs. In other 
words, as tax-collecting agent, municipal and federal state owners have a preferred claim on the 
firm’s profit and therefore prefer the tax claims even if this results in a lower after-tax dividend 
income. Therefore, we split our sample of SOEs based on the type of state owner, i.e., those that 
directly benefit from the tax income (federal and municipal) vs. those that do not (e.g., the 16 
states). We predict that SOEs with shareholders that directly benefit from the tax revenues engage 
less in tax planning (i.e., have a higher ETR and lower TaxAvoid).  
To this end, we estimate Equation (3) for both of those groups separately (both times with 
the Non-SOEs as control group). We present the results of this test in Columns 2 and 3 (Columns 
5 and 6) of Table 3 using ETR (TaxAvoid) as dependent variable. We find that the coefficient on 
SOE is positive (negative) and statistically significant only for the SOEs with directly benefitting 
state owners (Columns 2 and 5), implying less tax planning. In economic terms, SOEs with directly 
benefitting state owners have, on average, a 2.4 percentage points or 9.1 percent (relative to the 
sample mean) higher ETR than Non-SOEs.15 The results are similar when we use TaxAvoid as 
 
15 For this calculation, we divide the coefficient of 0.024 (Table 3, Column 2) by the mean ETR of the full sample 
(Table 1, Panel A): 0.024/0.2651 = 0.091. 
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dependent variables (the sign is negative, which implies lower tax avoidance). As TaxAvoid 
captures the deviation of the ETR from the statutory tax rate in a given municipality, we can rule 
out that Benefit SOEs are systematically located in municipalities with higher LBT rates and thus 
have higher ETRs. Similarly, we test for differences in the mean statutory tax rates of Benefit and 
Non-Benefit SOEs and find no statistically significant differences (untabulated). 
We corroborate the findings from these baseline tests by using entropy balancing and PSM 
to account for observable sample differences between SOEs and Non-SOEs as indicated by the 
descriptive statistics in Table 1. Table 5 and Table 7 (Columns 2 and 5) present the results and 
strengthen our initial interpretation as the coefficients on SOE remain statistically significant and 
are also economically very similar to those from the OLS estimation in Table 3. This finding 
indicates that our results are robust to observable differences between SOEs and Non-SOEs and 
to a potential functional form misspecification in our OLS estimations. Collectively, the results 
provide evidence in line with H2 as they suggest that SOEs with directly benefitting state owners 
(Benefit SOEs) engage in less tax planning. To further investigate the role of state owners’ 
incentives, we next focus on tests within the subsample of SOEs. 
4.3 Further Tests Using the SOE-only Sample 
To address concerns about inherent differences between SOEs and Non-SOEs, we 
investigate the subsample of 2,698 SOE firm-years (see Panel C of Table 1). Within this subsample, 
we can hold potential confounding factors, such as the selection choice of governments to invest 
in certain firms, constant. Relating to H2, we predict that SOEs with directly benefitting state 
owners have higher ETRs relative to non-local SOEs. We test this prediction by replacing the SOE 
dummy in Equation (3) with the dummy variable Benefit that is equal to one for SOEs with directly 
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benefitting state owners and zero otherwise.16 Again, we separately include state (𝛼𝑠), industry (𝛼𝑗)
 
17, and year (𝛼𝑡 ) fixed effects. The vector Controls includes the same control variables as in 
Equation (3). Formally, we estimate the following model using OLS: 
{
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
We present the results in Table 8 (Column 1) and find that the coefficient on Benefit is 
positive and statistically significant.18 The result is also similar in magnitude to our baseline results 
as it implies a 3.3 percentage point higher ETR for SOEs whose state owner directly benefits from 
tax revenues, relative to SOEs whose state owner does not. The results are similar when we use 
TaxAvoid as dependent variable (Column 4). Overall, this result corroborates our previous findings 
on H2 as the type of state owner affects the tax planning activities of an SOE. 
Moreover, we use the tax rate variation between German municipalities to extend our 
predictions and tests. While the results of the previous tests imply that municipal governments 
have an incentive to maximize tax revenues, they also need to maintain a competitive business 
environment with respect to other municipalities. Therefore, municipal governments face 
incentives to set attractive LBT rates while maintaining sufficient tax revenues (e.g., Buettner 2003; 
Foremny and Riedel 2014). As municipalities with higher LBT rates already collect higher 
absolute tax revenues (given the same tax base), SOEs in high tax municipalities (i.e., 
municipalities with above median LBT rates) might experience less pressure by the local state 
 
16  Specifically, the dummy variable Benefit equals one if an SOE’s shareholder is the federal government or a 
municipality and zero otherwise. 
17 In this specification, we use industry fixed effects based on the NACE one digit classification to ensure sufficient 
variation within the respective cells.  
18 As opposed to Hypothesis 1 (H1), Hypothesis 2 (H2) is directional, which requires a one-sided interpretation of the 
coefficients. However, to ensure consistency throughout the Tables, we continue to tabulate two-sided test statistics 
in Table 8. 
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owners. In other words, local owners may be more lenient in enforcing tax compliance when the 
LBT rate is already high. 
To test this prediction, we estimate Equation (4) and split the sample along the median 
LBT rate of 14.2 percent. We present the results in Table 8 (Column 2 and 3) and find that the 
positive association between state ownership and a firm’s ETR is concentrated among SOEs in 
low-tax municipalities. In terms of the magnitude, the positive coefficient on Benefit in Column 2 
implies a 4.3 percentage point higher ETR for Benefit SOEs relative to Non-Benefit SOEs. The 
results are similar when we use TaxAvoid as dependent variable (Column 5 and 6). To address 
concerns about systematically selecting the subsamples in the sample split, we test whether the 
split disproportionally assigns Benefit and Non-Benefit SOEs to the subsamples. That is, we test 
whether splitting the sample along the median LBT rate leads to a distribution of Benefit and Non-
Benefit SOEs that is different from that in the original sample (see Panel D and Panel E of Table 
1). We find that the distribution of Benefit and Non-Benefit SOEs is not different after splitting the 
sample, mitigating concerns about a spurious sample split (untabulated). 
We interpret this additional finding as evidence for the overall mechanism through which 
local state owners affect SOEs. That is, state owners affect SOEs’ tax planning when the state 
owner directly participates in the tax revenues. However, state owners seem to do that in a way 
that does not burden the taxpayer (i.e., the SOE) too heavily. A related interpretation is that 
municipalities with lower LBT rates have, on average, a lower GDP per capita (Bethmann 2017). 
Therefore, municipalities with lower LBT rates (Columns 2 and 5 of Table 6) need to raise more 
tax revenues, which they can do by ensuring lower tax planning activity by their SOEs. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this study, we present empirical evidence for the effect of shareholder-specific 
monitoring incentives on a firm’s tax planning activities. Using the unique setting in Germany, 
which provides variation in the degree to which a state owner benefits from an SOE’s tax payments, 
we show that the incentives of a state owner are an important determinant of SOEs’ tax planning 
activities. Specifically, we find that only state owners that benefit from the tax revenues engage in 
less tax planning. Our results are robust to various specifications and subsample tests.  
We contribute to prior research by showing that shareholder incentives are a determinant 
of tax planning activities. Moreover, we provide new evidence on the role of state ownership and 
corporate tax planning activities (e.g., Lin et al. 2018; Bradshaw et al. 2019). In the realm of SOEs, 
the shareholder incentives are unique as the shareholder (i.e., the state owner) has two claims on 
the firm’s residual, namely the tax payment and the after-tax dividend. When the state owner 
receives 100 percent of each of these claims, the owner should be indifferent on whether that claim 
is paid as a tax or as a dividend. In our setting, however, not every state owner directly benefits 
from the tax revenues. Using this variation in incentives, we find that only state owners that have 
a direct claim on the tax revenues have an incentive to ensure lower tax planning activities of the 
SOEs.  
Lastly, our findings inform policymakers on the tax consequences of state ownership, 
which addresses the current discussion on tax planning activities of firms that might become partly 
state owned as consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that in order to ensure lower tax 
planning in an SOE, the state owner has to have a claim on the tax revenues. As our study is set in 
a developed market economy with generally low governmental interferences, we believe that our 
findings are generalizable and of interest to policymakers around the world.  
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable Definition 
  
Benefit Dummy that is equal to one if an SOEs shareholder directly 
benefits from the firm's tax revenues 
  
ETR Effective Tax Rate, defined as tax expense (incl. deferrals) over 
pre-tax income 
  
Intangible Intangible assets scaled by lagged total assets   
Leverage Long-term (i.e., non-current) liabilities scaled by lagged total 
assets   
Lossfirm Dummy that is equal to one if a firm reports a loss in more than 
half of the available firm-years 
  
MajorSH Dummy that is equal to one if a firm has a majority shareholder 
(>50%) 
  
RoA Return on Assets, defined as operating income over lagged total 
assets   
SalesGrowth Change in sales relative to prior year's sales   
Size Natural logarithm of total assets   
SOE State-owned Enterprises dummy that is equal to one if a firm is 
(partly) owned by a government entity 
  
SOE_share The percentage of  shares the government entity holds of the SOE 
  
Tangibility Fixed assets scaled by lagged total assets   
TaxAvoid Statutory tax rate (includes federal corporate tax rate in year t and 
local business tax in municipality m in year t) minus ETR 
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLE SELECTION 
Sample Selection 
Observations 
(firm-years) 
Firms headquartered in Germany (from Orbis) after dropping: obs. w/ no or 
limited financial information, financials (NACE 6400 to 6899), utilities 
(NACE 3500 to 3999),  and consolidated accounts 
504,048 
After merging shareholder information (from Orbis) 481,071 
After dropping obs. in industries (NACE 2-digit) that do not include SOEs 441,713 
After dropping non-profit firms 433,022 
After dropping obs. w/ missing values for ETR, Leverage, Tangibility, Size, 
Intangibles, SalesGrowth, or RoA; or obs. w/ values above (below) 
300% (-300%) for SalesGrowth 
133,052 
After dropping obs. w/ values outside of the 1-99 percentiles of 
observations of ETR, Tangibility, Leverage, or RoA 
124,613 
Final sample 124,613 
 
  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3632938
26 
 
References 
Armstrong, C. S., J. L. Blouin, A. D. Jagolinzer, and D. F. Larcker. 2015. Corporate governance, 
incentives, and tax avoidance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 60 (1): 1–17. 
Armstrong, C. S., J. L. Blouin, and D. F. Larcker. 2012. The incentives for tax planning. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 53 (1): 391–411. 
Atwood, T. J., M. S. Drake, J. N. Myers, and L. A. Myers. 2012. Home Country Tax System 
Characteristics and Corporate Tax Avoidance: International Evidence. The Accounting 
Review 87 (6): 1831–1860. 
Badertscher, B., N. Shroff, and H. D. White. 2013. Externalities of public firm presence: Evidence 
from private firms’ investment decisions. Journal of Financial Economics 109 (3): 682–
706. 
Bardt, H., and W. Fuest. 2007. Die wirtschaftliche Betätigung der Kommunen. IW Trends 3/2007. 
Bauer, A. M., J. Fang, J. Pittman, Y. Zhang, and Y. Zhao. 2019. How Aggressive Tax Planning 
Facilitates the Diversion of Corporate Resources: Evidence from Path Analysis. 
Contemporary Accounting Research (Forthcoming). 
Bethmann, I. 2017. Heterogeneity in Tax Rate Elasticities of Capital: Evidence from Local 
Business Tax Reforms. FAccT Center Working Paper Nr. 24/2017. 
Bradshaw, M., G. Liao, and M. (Shuai) Ma. 2019. Agency costs and tax planning when the 
government is a major Shareholder. Journal of Accounting and Economics 67 (2–3): 255–
277. 
Brown, J. L., K. Drake, and L. Wellman. 2015. The Benefits of a Relational Approach to Corporate 
Political Activity: Evidence from Political Contributions to Tax Policymakers. The Journal 
of the American Taxation Association 37 (1): 69–102. 
Buettner, T. 2003. Tax base effects and fiscal externalities of local capital taxation: evidence from 
a panel of German jurisdictions. Journal of Urban Economics 54 (1): 110–128. 
Bundeskartellamt. 2014. Der Staat als Unternehmer. Hintergrundpapier. Tagung des 
Arbeitskreises Kartellrecht, October 2, 2014. 
Bundesministerium der Finanzen. 2018. Beteiligungsbericht des Bundes 2018. 
Chan, K. H., P. L. L. Mo, and A. Y. Zhou. 2013. Government ownership, corporate governance 
and tax aggressiveness: evidence from China. Accounting & Finance 53 (4): 1029–1051. 
Chen, S., X. Chen, Q. Cheng, and T. Shevlin. 2010. Are family firms more tax aggressive than 
non-family firms? Journal of Financial Economics 95 (1): 41–61. 
Cheng, C. S. A., H. H. Huang, Y. Li, and J. Stanfield. 2012. The Effect of Hedge Fund Activism 
on Corporate Tax Avoidance. The Accounting Review 87 (5): 1493–1526. 
De Simone, L., L. F. Mills, and B. Stomberg. 2019. Using IRS data to identify income shifting to 
foreign affiliates. Review of Accounting Studies 24 (2): 694–730. 
De Simone, L., B. Stomberg, and B. Williams. 2019. Does Tax Enforcement Disparately Affect 
Domestic versus Multinational Corporations Around the World? Kelley School of Business 
Research Paper No. 18-68; Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research 
Paper No. 18-37. 
Desai, M. A., and D. Dharmapala. 2006. Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. 
Journal of Financial Economics 79 (1): 145–179. 
Desai, M. A., and D. Dharmapala. 2009. Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value. The Review 
of Economics and Statistics 91 (3): 537–546. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3632938
27 
 
Dyreng, S. D., M. Hanlon, and E. L. Maydew. 2008. Long‐Run Corporate Tax Avoidance. The 
Accounting Review 83 (1): 61–82. 
Engel, D., and T. Middendorf. 2009. Investment, internal funds and public banking in Germany. 
Journal of Banking & Finance 33 (11): 2132–2139. 
Foremny, D., and N. Riedel. 2014. Business taxes and the electoral cycle. Journal of Public 
Economics 115: 48–61. 
Graham, J. R., M. Hanlon, T. Shevlin, and N. Shroff. 2014. Incentives for Tax Planning and 
Avoidance: Evidence from the Field. The Accounting Review 89 (3): 991–1023. 
Hainmueller, J. 2012. Entropy Balancing for Causal Effects: A Multivariate Reweighting Method 
to Produce Balanced Samples in Observational Studies. Political Analysis 20 (1): 25–46. 
Hanlon, M., and S. Heitzman. 2010. A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 50 (2–3): 127–178. 
Kahan, M., and E. B. Rock. 2011. When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder. Texas 
Law Review 89 (6): 73. 
Khan, M., S. Srinivasan, and L. Tan. 2017. Institutional Ownership and Corporate Tax Avoidance: 
New Evidence. The Accounting Review 92 (2): 101–122. 
Khurana, I. K., and W. J. Moser. 2013. Institutional Shareholders’ Investment Horizons and Tax 
Avoidance. The Journal of the American Taxation Association 35 (1): 111–134. 
Kim, C. F., and L. Zhang. 2016. Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness. 
Contemporary Accounting Research 33 (1): 78–114. 
Kowalski, P., M. Büge, M. Sztajerowska, and M. Egeland. 2013. State-Owned Enterprises: Trade 
Effects and Policy Implications. OECD Trade Policy Papers. 
Lin, K. Z., L. F. Mills, F. Zhang, and Y. Li. 2018. Do Political Connections Weaken Tax 
Enforcement Effectiveness? Contemporary Accounting Research 35 (4): 1941–1972. 
McGuire, S. T., D. Wang, and R. J. Wilson. 2014. Dual Class Ownership and Tax Avoidance. The 
Accounting Review 89 (4): 1487–1516. 
Monopolkommission. 2014. Hauptgutachten XX. 
Shipman, J. E., Q. T. Swanquist, and R. L. Whited. 2017. Propensity Score Matching in 
Accounting Research. The Accounting Review 92 (1): 213–244. 
State of Lower Saxony. 2017. Beteiligungsbericht der Landes Niedersachsen 2017. 
Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. 1986. Positive Accounting Theory. NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc. 
Wilde, J. H., and R. J. Wilson. 2018. Perspectives on Corporate Tax Planning: Observations from 
the Past Decade. The Journal of the American Taxation Association 40 (2): 63–81. 
Wu, L., Y. Wang, W. Luo, and P. Gillis. 2012. State ownership, tax status and size effect of 
effective tax rate in China. Accounting and Business Research 42 (2): 97–114. 
Zeng, T. 2010. Ownership Concentration, State Ownership, and Effective Tax Rates: Evidence 
from China’s Listed Firms. Accounting Perspectives 9 (4): 271–289. 
Zimmerman, J. L. 1983. Taxes and firm size. Journal of Accounting and Economics 5: 119–149. 
  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3632938
28 
 
TABLES 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean S.D. Q1 Median Q3 
 Panel A: Full Sample  
ETR 124,613 0.2651 0.1727 0.1389 0.2926 0.3371 
TaxAvoid 124,613 0.0324 0.1730 -0.0378 -0.0013 0.1583 
SOE 124,613 0.0217 0.1455 0 0 0 
RoA  124,613 0.1425 0.1409 0.0504 0.0981 0.1845 
Tangibility 124,613 0.2832 0.2538 0.0748 0.2032 0.4344 
Size 124,613 8.2958 1.9878 6.7845 8.2472 9.7286 
SalesGrowth 124,613 0.1098 0.3541 -0.0414 0.0485 0.1789 
Leverage 124,613 0.3174 0.2768 0.1119 0.2379 0.4403 
Intangible 124,613 0.0169 0.0587 0.0000 0.0012 0.0080 
Lossfirm 124,613 0.0896 0.2857 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MajorSH 124,613 0.9241 0.2648 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 Panel B: Non-SOEs only 
ETR 121,915 0.2660 0.1710 0.1429 0.2933 0.3371 
TaxAvoid 121,915 0.0315 0.1714 -0.0378 -0.0016 0.1533 
RoA  121,915 0.1445 0.1413 0.0519 0.1000 0.1870 
Tangibility 121,915 0.2759 0.2482 0.0733 0.1983 0.4213 
Size 121,915 8.2559 1.9705 6.7627 8.2028 9.6645 
SalesGrowth 121,915 0.1109 0.3561 -0.0426 0.0492 0.1818 
Leverage 121,915 0.3178 0.2778 0.1117 0.2376 0.4404 
Intangible 121,915 0.0168 0.0588 0.0000 0.0011 0.0079 
Lossfirm 121,915 0.0877 0.2829 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MajorSH 121,915 0.9389 0.2396 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 Panel C: SOEs only 
ETR 2,698 0.2261* 0.2312 0.0262 0.1627 0.3333 
TaxAvoid 2,698 0.0728* 0.2307 -0.0365 0.1332 0.2666 
SOE_share 2,698 72.5468* 37.1108 49.0000 99.9700 100.0000 
RoA  2,698 0.0529* 0.0798 0.0134 0.0293 0.0597 
Tangibility 2,698 0.6137* 0.2862 0.4335 0.7035 0.8290 
Size 2,698 10.0968* 1.9346 8.9598 10.3674 11.4209 
SalesGrowth 2,698 0.0588* 0.2406 0.0008 0.0366 0.0797 
Leverage 2,698 0.3007* 0.2255 0.1195 0.2516 0.4338 
Intangible 2,698 0.0226* 0.0545 0.0005 0.0036 0.0188 
Lossfirm 2,698 0.1764* 0.3813 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MajorSH 2,698 0.2595* 0.4384 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
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 Panel D: Benefit SOEs only 
ETR 1,156 0.2513 0.2271 0.0486 0.2167 0.3745 
TaxAvoid 1,156 0.0508 0.2287 -0.0699 0.0829 0.2536 
SOE_share 1,156 83.7596 30.1979 74.9000 100.0000 100.0000 
RoA  1,156 0.0455 0.0633 0.0145 0.0287 0.0550 
Tangibility 1,156 0.6443 0.2763 0.5120 0.7187 0.8439 
Size 1,156 10.1968 1.9521 9.0541 10.4285 11.5595 
SalesGrowth 1,156 0.0547 0.2683 -0.0097 0.0322 0.0778 
Leverage 1,156 0.3588 0.2283 0.1699 0.3372 0.5151 
Intangible 1,156 0.0187 0.0491 0.0002 0.0026 0.0145 
Lossfirm 1,156 0.1583 0.3652 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MajorSH 1,156 0.1202 0.3254 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Panel E: Non-Benefit SOEs only 
ETR 1,542 0.2071* 0.2325 0.0196 0.1298 0.3187 
TaxAvoid 1,542 0.0893* 0.2309 -0.0185 0.1629 0.2720 
SOE_share 1,542 64.1409* 39.5201 25.2000 64.9650 100.0000 
RoA  1,542 0.0584* 0.0898 0.0130 0.0299 0.0648 
Tangibility 1,542 0.5907* 0.2913 0.3819 0.6856 0.8147 
Size 1,542 10.0217 1.9186 8.8532 10.2483 11.3347 
SalesGrowth 1,542 0.0620 0.2175 0.0078 0.0393 0.0812 
Leverage 1,542 0.2570* 0.2133 0.0958 0.2032 0.3551 
Intangible 1,542 0.0255* 0.0580 0.0010 0.0043 0.0232 
Lossfirm 1,542 0.1900 0.3924 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MajorSH 1,542 0.3638* 0.4813 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics. Panel A presents information for the full sample. Panel B (C) displays 
information for the subsample of firm-years with (without) state ownership. Panel D (E) presents information on the 
subsample of firm-years with state ownership where the state owner does (does not) directly benefit from the tax 
revenues. In Panel C (Panel E), * denotes significant differences relative to Panel B (Panel D) at the 1% level (two-
tailed). 
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Table 2: Correlation Table 
Variables ETR TaxAvoid SOE RoA  Tangibility Size 
Sales 
Growth 
Leverage Intangible Lossfirm MajorSH 
ETR 1       
   
 
TaxAvoid -0.9936 1      
   
 
SOE -0.0336 0.0347 1     
   
 
RoA  -0.1042 0.1065 -0.0946 1    
   
 
Tangibility -0.0609 0.0549 0.1937 -0.0927 1   
   
 
Size -0.0389 0.0422 0.1348 -0.2125 0.196 1  
   
 
SalesGrowth -0.0379 0.0371 -0.0214 0.1953 0.0079 -0.0891 1 
   
 
Leverage -0.0271 0.0243 -0.009 0.0784 0.1775 -0.1342 0.0973 1    
Intangible -0.0406 0.0445 0.0144 0.0246 0.1816 0.0268 0.0387 0.0391 1   
Lossfirm -0.0981 0.0989 0.0452 -0.0669 0.0396 0.0185 0.0234 0.0455 0.0414 1  
MajorSH 0.0282 -0.0269 -0.3735 0.0377 -0.0973 -0.1004 0.0092 0.0045 -0.0252 -0.039 1 
Note: This table presents the Pearson correlation matrix. Bold coefficients indicate significance at the 1% level (two-tailed). 
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Table 3: OLS Regression 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
 
Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample w/ 
Benefit 
SOEs 
Full 
Sample w/ 
Non-
Benefit 
SOEs 
Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample w/ 
Benefit 
SOEs 
Full 
Sample w/ 
Non-
Benefit 
SOEs 
 
Variables 
SOE 0.006 0.024** -0.006 -0.005 -0.022* 0.006 
  (0.721) (2.150) (-0.591) (-0.574) (-1.924) (0.597) 
RoA -0.162*** -0.162*** -0.162*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.163*** 
 (-31.027) (-31.152) (-30.975) (31.520) (31.652) (31.453) 
Tangibility -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.014*** 0.009*** 0.009** 0.010*** 
 (-3.720) (-3.609) (-3.916) (2.622) (2.484) (2.818) 
Size -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (-3.225) (-3.458) (-3.034) (4.334) (4.530) (4.096) 
SalesGrowth -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (-4.075) (-3.934) (-3.984) (4.050) (3.905) (3.960) 
Leverage -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 (-4.092) (-4.687) (-4.321) (4.167) (4.752) (4.375) 
Intangible -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.053*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 
 (-3.797) (-3.858) (-3.811) (4.342) (4.401) (4.345) 
LossFirm -0.056*** -0.057*** -0.056*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 
 (-24.312) (-24.911) (-24.221) (24.537) (25.148) (24.437) 
MajorSH 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.009*** 
 (3.054) (3.495) (3.559) (-2.832) (-3.310) (-3.345) 
Observations 124,600 123,059 123,444 124,600 123,059 123,444 
Adjusted R² 0.081 0.079 0.082 0.083 0.081 0.084 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: This table presents regression results for tests of the association between state ownership and tax planning 
(Equation 3) estimated using OLS. The dependent variables are ETR (Columns 1-3) and TaxAvoid (Columns 4-
6). All variables are defined in Appendix A. In Columns 1 and 4, the estimation uses the full sample. In Columns 
2 and 5 (3 and 6), we only include SOEs with state owners that do (do not) directly benefit from the tax revenues. 
We include state, industry (NACE two digit), and year indicators. Standard errors are clustered on the firm level 
and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively (two-tailed).  
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Table 4: Entropy Balancing Statistics 
Variables Mean Variance Skewness Mean Variance Skewness 
 
Panel A: Full Sample before Entropy Balancing 
 SOEs Non-SOEs 
RoA  0.0529 0.0064 4.0390 0.1445 0.0200 2.1520 
Tangibility 0.6137 0.0819 -0.7487 0.2759 0.0616 1.0320 
Size 10.1000 3.7430 -0.5794 8.2560 3.8830 0.2139 
SalesGrowth 0.0588 0.0579 4.2710 0.1109 0.1268 2.7620 
Leverage 0.3007 0.0509 1.0530 0.3178 0.0772 1.5630 
Intangible 0.0226 0.0030 4.9830 0.0168 0.0035 7.3130 
Lossfirm 0.1764 0.1454 1.6980 0.0877 0.0800 2.9150 
MajorSH 0.2595 0.1922 1.0980 0.9389 0.0574 -3.6630 
 
Panel B: Full Sample after Entropy Balancing 
 SOEs Non-SOEs 
RoA  0.0529 0.0064 4.0390 0.0529 0.0064 4.0400 
Tangibility 0.6137 0.0819 -0.7487 0.6136 0.0819 -0.7485 
Size 10.1000 3.7430 -0.5794 10.1000 3.7440 -0.5796 
SalesGrowth 0.0588 0.0579 4.2710 0.0589 0.0579 4.2710 
Leverage 0.3007 0.0509 1.0530 0.3007 0.0509 1.0560 
Intangible 0.0226 0.0030 4.9830 0.0226 0.0030 4.9840 
Lossfirm 0.1764 0.1454 1.6980 0.1765 0.1454 1.6970 
MajorSH 0.2595 0.1922 1.0980 0.2596 0.1922 1.0970 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics before (Panel A) and after (Panel B) entropy 
balancing. We present descriptives on the mean, variance, and skewness of each balancing 
covariate for SOEs (Non-SOEs) in the first (last) three columns. In Panel A, * denotes 
significant mean differences between SOEs and Non-SOEs at the 1% level (two-tailed). 
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Table 5: Entropy Balancing 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
 
Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample w/ 
Benefit 
SOEs 
Full 
Sample w/ 
Non-
Benefit 
SOEs 
Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample w/ 
Benefit 
SOEs 
Full 
Sample w/ 
Non-
Benefit 
SOEs 
 
Variables 
SOE 0.012 0.028** -0.007 -0.012 -0.026* 0.006 
  (1.139) (2.112) (-0.526) (-1.103) (-1.933) (0.468) 
RoA -0.178*** -0.192*** -0.162*** 0.179*** 0.196*** 0.162*** 
 (-3.598) (-5.535) (-3.118) (3.656) (5.880) (3.103) 
Tangibility -0.047*** -0.054*** -0.066*** 0.041** 0.047*** 0.061*** 
 (-2.729) (-3.430) (-3.546) (2.357) (3.024) (3.269) 
Size -0.003 -0.007*** 0.001 0.004 0.008*** 0.001 
 (-1.032) (-2.657) (0.178) (1.583) (3.170) (0.276) 
SalesGrowth -0.018* -0.014 -0.017 0.019* 0.015 0.018 
 (-1.719) (-1.361) (-1.391) (1.801) (1.446) (1.503) 
Leverage 0.102*** 0.096*** 0.101*** -0.100*** -0.095*** -0.101*** 
 (4.765) (4.829) (4.230) (-4.660) (-4.737) (-4.182) 
Intangible 0.082 0.129* 0.072 -0.067 -0.115* -0.061 
 (1.046) (1.896) (0.868) (-0.855) (-1.688) (-0.735) 
LossFirm -0.011 -0.022* -0.003 0.012 0.023** 0.004 
 (-1.006) (-1.942) (-0.211) (1.139) (2.064) (0.328) 
MajorSH 0.001 0.004 0.009 0.001 -0.002 -0.007 
 (0.185) (0.479) (1.224) (0.091) (-0.258) (-0.898) 
Observations 124,600 123,059 123,444 124,600 123,059 123,444 
Adjusted R² 0.158 0.143 0.180 0.156 0.147 0.176 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: This table presents regression results for tests of the association between state ownership and tax planning 
(Equation 3) estimated using an entropy-balanced sample. The dependent variables are ETR (Columns 1-3) and 
TaxAvoid (Columns 4-6). All variables are defined in Appendix A. In Columns 1 and 4, the estimation uses the full 
sample. In Columns 2 and 5 (3 and 6), we only include SOEs with state owners that do (do not) directly benefit from 
the tax revenues. We include state, industry (NACE two digit), and year indicators. Standard errors are clustered on 
the firm level and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively (two-tailed).  
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics (Propensity Score Matching) 
Variables N Mean S.D. Q1 Median Q3 
 
Panel A: Full Sample after Propensity Score Matching 
ETR 4,515 0.2282 0.2161 0.0338 0.1925 0.3316 
TaxAvoid 4,515 0.0696 0.2161 -0.0319 0.1043 0.2597 
RoA  4,515 0.0585 0.0761 0.0159 0.0353 0.0740 
Tangibility 4,515 0.5940 0.2918 0.3779 0.6761 0.8197 
Size 4,515 9.9930 2.0241 8.8134 10.1867 11.3631 
SalesGrowth 4,515 0.0619 0.2603 -0.0103 0.0362 0.0931 
Leverage 4,515 0.2963 0.2285 0.1145 0.2450 0.4250 
Intangible 4,515 0.0232 0.0690 0.0002 0.0029 0.0146 
Lossfirm 4,515 0.1708 0.3763 0 0 0 
MajorSH 4,515 0.3125 0.4636 0 0 1 
 Panel B: Sample after PSM - Non-SOEs only 
ETR 1,819 0.2311 0.1915 0.0566 0.2339 0.3264 
TaxAvoid 1,819 0.0650 0.1923 -0.0272 0.0582 0.2398 
RoA  1,819 0.0668 0.0694 0.0218 0.0496 0.0911 
Tangibility 1,819 0.5648 0.2975 0.3344 0.6218 0.7999 
Size 1,819 9.8397 2.1404 8.5537 9.9675 11.2111 
SalesGrowth 1,819 0.0666 0.2871 -0.0346 0.0351 0.1188 
Leverage 1,819 0.2899 0.2327 0.1069 0.2301 0.4152 
Intangible 1,819 0.0242 0.0862 0.0000 0.0020 0.0100 
Lossfirm 1,819 0.1627 0.3692 0 0 0 
MajorSH 1,819 0.3914 0.4882 0 0 1 
 Panel C: Sample after PSM - SOEs only 
ETR 2,696 0.2262 0.2312 0.0262 0.1628 0.3333 
TaxAvoid 2,696 0.0727 0.2308 -0.0366 0.1330 0.2667 
RoA  2,696 0.0529* 0.0798 0.0134 0.0292 0.0597 
Tangibility 2,696 0.6137* 0.2862 0.4332 0.7038 0.8291 
Size 2,696 10.0965* 1.9352 8.9595 10.3674 11.4214 
SalesGrowth 2,696 0.0587 0.2405 0.0008 0.0365 0.0793 
Leverage 2,696 0.3006 0.2255 0.1195 0.2516 0.4337 
Intangible 2,696 0.0226 0.0545 0.0005 0.0036 0.0188 
Lossfirm 2,696 0.1762 0.3810 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MajorSH 2,696 0.2593* 0.4383 0 0 1 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample after Propensity Score 
Matching (with replacement). Panel A presents information for the full sample. Panel 
B (C) displays information for the subsample of firm-years with (without) state 
ownership. In Panel C, * denotes significant differences relative to Panel B at the 1% 
level (two-tailed). 
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Table 7: Propensity Score Matching 
  Dependent Variable: ETR Dependent Variable: TaxAvoid 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
 
Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample w/ 
Benefit 
SOEs 
Full 
Sample w/ 
Non-
Benefit 
SOEs 
Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample w/ 
Benefit 
SOEs 
Full 
Sample w/ 
Non-
Benefit 
SOEs 
 
Variables 
SOE 0.027** 0.041*** 0.007 -0.026** -0.039** -0.007 
  (2.255) (2.737) (0.515) (-2.175) (-2.574) (-0.510) 
RoA -0.181*** -0.189*** -0.179** 0.179*** 0.191*** 0.175** 
 (-2.695) (-2.855) (-2.434) (2.687) (2.953) (2.367) 
Tangibility -0.047** -0.052*** -0.070*** 0.040** 0.044** 0.064*** 
 (-2.451) (-2.647) (-3.250) (2.077) (2.270) (2.976) 
Size -0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.002 0.004 -0.001 
 (-0.320) (-1.079) (0.779) (0.744) (1.402) (-0.471) 
SalesGrowth -0.023* -0.022 -0.025 0.024* 0.023 0.026 
 (-1.765) (-1.513) (-1.557) (1.843) (1.577) (1.642) 
Leverage 0.095*** 0.087*** 0.094*** -0.093*** -0.085*** -0.093*** 
 (3.938) (3.473) (3.441) (-3.811) (-3.365) (-3.361) 
Intangible 0.012 0.022 0.007 -0.004 -0.016 -0.003 
 (0.175) (0.326) (0.101) (-0.062) (-0.225) (-0.048) 
LossFirm -0.016 -0.027** -0.008 0.018 0.029** 0.010 
 (-1.480) (-2.158) (-0.657) (1.635) (2.320) (0.794) 
MajorSH 0.000 0.002 0.009 0.001 -0.001 -0.007 
 (0.052) (0.176) (0.998) (0.120) (-0.119) (-0.798) 
Observations 5,393 3,852 4,238 5,393 3,852 4,238 
Adjusted R² 0.151 0.121 0.174 0.148 0.125 0.170 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: This table presents regression results for tests of the association between state ownership and tax planning 
(Equation 3) estimated on a matched sample using Propensity Score Matching (with replacement). The dependent 
variables are ETR (Columns 1-3) and TaxAvoid (Columns 4-6). All variables are defined in Appendix A. In 
Columns 1 and 4, the estimation uses the full sample. In Columns 2 and 5 (3 and 6), we only include SOEs with 
state owners that do (do not) directly benefit from the tax revenues. We include state, industry (NACE two digit), 
and year indicators. Standard errors are clustered on the firm level and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 8: SOE Sample 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
Coef. (t-
stat) 
 
All SOEs 
LBT rate 
below 
median 
LBT rate 
above 
median 
All SOEs 
LBT rate 
below 
median 
LBT rate 
above 
median 
 
Variables 
Benefit 0.033** 0.043* 0.009 -0.030* -0.041* -0.009 
  (2.008) (1.920) (0.365) (-1.826) (-1.830) (-0.388) 
RoA -0.140 -0.315** -0.101 0.136 0.302* 0.102 
 (-1.110) (-1.988) (-0.643) (1.091) (1.921) (0.648) 
Tangibility -0.058 -0.050 -0.085* 0.046 0.043 0.080 
 (-1.533) (-0.811) (-1.703) (1.228) (0.707) (1.595) 
Size -0.003 -0.008 0.004 0.005 0.009 -0.003 
 (-0.568) (-1.469) (0.494) (0.943) (1.627) (-0.422) 
SalesGrowth -0.014 -0.004 -0.011 0.015 0.005 0.012 
 (-0.878) (-0.149) (-0.594) (0.889) (0.192) (0.633) 
Leverage 0.128*** 0.105** 0.151** -0.124*** -0.105** -0.148** 
 (3.254) (2.088) (2.578) (-3.155) (-2.115) (-2.533) 
Intangible 0.129 -0.192 0.381* -0.111 0.199 -0.379* 
 (0.955) (-1.143) (1.842) (-0.825) (1.194) (-1.837) 
LossFirm -0.041** -0.014 -0.064*** 0.042*** 0.015 0.066*** 
 (-2.538) (-0.635) (-2.746) (2.629) (0.688) (2.816) 
MajorSH -0.014 -0.025 -0.014 0.018 0.027 0.014 
 (-0.915) (-1.305) (-0.607) (1.145) (1.438) (0.619) 
Observations 2,697 1,320 1,370 2,697 1,320 1,370 
Adjusted R² 0.085 0.106 0.091 0.080 0.107 0.093 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: This table presents regression results for tests of the association between state ownership and tax 
planning (Equation 4) estimated using OLS. The dependent variables are ETR (Columns 1-3) and TaxAvoid 
(Columns 4-6). All variables are defined in Appendix A. In Columns 1 and 4, the estimation uses the full 
sample of SOEs. In Columns 2 and 5 (3 and 6), we partition the sample and only include observations with 
LBT multipliers below (above) the median. We include state, industry (NACE one digit), and year indicators. 
Standard errors are clustered on the firm level and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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